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Canonical completeness of infinitary µ
Gerhard Ja¨ger Mathis Kretz∗ Thomas Studer
Abstract
This paper presents a new model construction for a natural cut-free
infinitary version K+ω (µ) of the propositional modal µ-calculus. Based
on that the completeness of K+ω (µ) and the related system Kω(µ) can
be established directly – no detour, for example through automata
theory, is needed. As a side result we also obtain a finite, cut-free
sound and complete system for the propositional modal µ-calculus.
1 Introduction
The propositional modal µ-calculus, introduced in Kozen [13], is a remark-
able and well-established formalism which extends the usual (multi-)modal
propositional logic by operators for least and greatest fixed points of positive
operators. It is notoriously intricate, mainly due to the possibility of forming
complicate nestings of least and greatest fixed points, and plays a central role
in many logic-oriented approaches to computer science, in particular in con-
nection with so-called programming logics and process calculi. The reader
may consult Bradfield and Stirling [5] for a first overview and as a good guide
to the literature.
During the previous two decades a lot of substantial research has been carried
through in connection with the propositional modal µ-calculus, mainly fo-
cusing on its automata- and model-theoretic properties and its behavior with
respect to model checking. There are also lines of research which consider the
µ-calculus as an algebraic system rather than a logic. The relevant literature
is affluent, and we confine ourselves to mentioning only a few typical articles
which provide a good point of departure for further reading: Arnold and
Niwin´ski [2], Bradfield [4], Emerson, Jutla and Sistla [7], Gra¨del [9], Janin
and Walukiewicz [12], Lenzi [16], Santocanale [18, 19], Stirling and Walker
[22], Streett and Emerson [23], Winskel [26].
∗Research partly supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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Corresponding work on the proof theory of the propositional modal µ-calcu-
lus has been slower to be achieved. Kozen [13], among other results, presents
a sound axiomatization and shows it to be complete for a restricted version of
the µ-calculus. Walukiewicz [24] analyzes an interesting sound and complete
deductive system for the µ-calculus, and Walukiewicz [25] deals with the
completenes of Kozen’s original axiomatization. However, automata- rather
than proof-theoretic methods are at the core of this approach.
There are also approaches to the propositional modal µ-calculus via tableaux
calculi which provide some interesting proof-theoretic information and several
useful deductive systems. Examples of those can be found, for example, in
Stirling and Walker [22] and Winskel [26]. More recent work on the modal
µ-calculus, also with some proof-theoertic flavor, is in Dam and Gurov [6]
and Sprenger and Dam [21]. In these articles Gentzen-style sequent calculi
for modal and first order µ-calculi with approximations are introduced and
studied in connection with program verification and explicit inductions.
Kozen [14] exhibits an important connection between the finite model prop-
erty of the propositional modal µ-calculus and the theory of well-quasi-orders.
This paper also mentions an infinitary derivation rule, similar to those which
we will introduce later, and proves soundness as well as completeness of a
deduction system incorporating this rule.
In the focus of this article are two natural infinitary versions Kω(µ) and
K+ω (µ) of the propositional modal µ-calculus. Both are based on a sort of
ω-rule for introducing greatest fixed points and the usual closure rule
A[(µX)A[X]] =⇒ (µX)A[X](?)
for least fixed points. Actually, in order to be precise, a Tait-style refor-
mulation of (?) will be used in the formulations of Kω(µ) and K
+
ω (µ); see
Section 4. By means of the small model property Kω(µ) is later collapsed
to a finite cut-free system K<ω(µ). As it turns out, Kω(µ) contains K
+
ω (µ)
and is itself contained in K<ω(µ); in addition, all three systems prove exactly
those sentences which are valid with respect to the standard semantics of the
µ-calculus.
Proving the completeness of K+ω (µ) is the technically challenging part of the
present study. From Alberucci and Ja¨ger [1] we adapt the notion of saturated
set and use those sets to build a syntactic Kripke structure. Problems arise
in connection with the rule (?) which is inherently impredicative in the sense
that the logical complexity ofA[(µX)A[X]] is greater than that of (µX)A[X].
Hence direct proofs by induction on the lengths of formulas cannot be carried
through. However, by a more careful assignment of ranks (finite sequences of
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ordinals rather than ordinals), combined with ideas from Streett and Emerson
[23], we achieve our goal.
This paper presents an, as we think, new model construction which is a
canonical extension of standard model constructions in modal logic. Based on
that the completeness of natural infinitary versions of the propositional modal
µ-calculus is obtained directly – no detour, for example through automata
theory, is needed. As a side result we also obtain a cut-free and complete finite
system for µ. Similar techniques have been exploited before, see Ja¨ger, Kretz
and Studer [10, 11], in order to design cut-free, sound and complete deductive
system for the logic of common knowledge and the stratified propositional
modal µ-calculus.
We thank the referee of a preliminary version of this article for helpful com-
ments.
2 Monotone operators
The sole purpose of this section is to recapitulate some basic facts concern-
ing least and greatest fixed points of monotone operators. While doing this,
we also fix some notation which will be convenient for our later purposes.
For further reading, proofs of the properties stated below and relevant back-
ground information we refer, for example, to the textbooks Barwise [3] and
Moschovakis [17].
Given a set S, we write Pow(S) for the power set of S. The collection of
all ordinals is denoted by On, and ω is the least infinite ordinal, generally
identified with the set of all natural numbers.
Definition 1 Let M be an arbitrary set. A monotone operator on M is a
mapping Φ from Pow(M) to Pow(M), Φ : Pow(M)→ Pow(M), so that for
all subsets S0 and S1 of M
S0 ⊂ S1 =⇒ Φ(S0) ⊂ Φ(S1).
If Φ(S) = S for some subset S of M , then S is called a fixed point of the
operator Φ.
Starting with the empty set, iterated applications of the monotone operator Φ
give us what we call the lower stages of Φ. Alternatively, it is also possible to
begin with the whole domain, and then successive applications of Φ generate
its upper stages.
Definition 2 Let M be an arbitrary set and Φ an arbitrary monotone op-
erator on M .
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1. By transfinite induction on the ordinals we define for each α ∈ On the
lower and upper stages of Φ as follows
I<αΦ :=
⋃
β<α
Φ(I<βΦ ) and J
<α
Φ :=
⋂
β<α
Φ(J<βΦ ).
2. Based on these stages we set
IΦ :=
⋃
α∈On
I<αΦ and JΦ :=
⋂
α∈On
J<αΦ .
Well-known classical results state that for any monotone operator Φ on a
set M the sequence of its lower stages (I<αΦ : α ∈ On) is increasing and
approximates its least fixed point IΦ. What is more, to obtain IΦ, not all
ordinals are needed but only an initial segment whose cardinality is bound
by the cardinality of M . By duality, we have the corresponding theorem
concerning the greatest fixed point of a monotone operator.
Theorem 3 (Least and greatest fixed points) Let M be an arbitrary
set and Φ an arbitrary monotone operator on M . Then we have:
1. The lower stages of Φ are increasing and its upper stages decreasing,
i.e. for all ordinals α and β
α ≤ β =⇒ I<αΦ ⊂ I<βΦ and J<βΦ ⊂ J<αΦ .
2. IΦ is the least fixed point of Φ and JΦ its greatest fixed point; moreover
IΦ =
⋂{S ⊂M : Φ(S) ⊂ S} = ⋂{S ⊂M : S = Φ(S)},
JΦ =
⋃{S ⊂M : S ⊂ Φ(S)} = ⋃{S ⊂M : Φ(S) = S}.
3. There exist ordinals α and β of cardinality less than or equal to the
cardinality of M so that IΦ = I
<α
Φ and JΦ = J
<β
Φ .
3 Syntax and semantics of the propositional
modal µ-calculus
We will formulate the propositional modal µ-calculus in a language Lµ which
comprises the following syntactically different basic symbols:
1. Arbitrarily many labels a, b, c and countably many atomic propositions
P,Q,R (both possibly with subscripts);
4
2. Countably many free variables U, V,W and countably many bound vari-
ables X, Y, Z (both possibly with subscripts);
3. The propositional constants ⊥ and >, the propositional connectives ∨
and ∧ plus the connective ∼ for forming the complements of atomic
propositions and free variables;
4. For each label a the modal operators 〈a〉 and [a];
5. The fixed point operators µ and ν.
As auxiliary symbols we allow parentheses, brackets and commas. Substitu-
tions of formulas for free variables will be very important in the following and
throughout the sequel. In order to be able to describe such manipulations in
a convenient way, the following notation is introduced.
By an n-ary nominal form (n ≥ 1) we mean a non-empty finite string of
symbols which contains in addition to the basic symbols of Lµ at most the
nominal symbols ∗1, . . . , ∗n. These nominal symbols are supposed to be dif-
ferent from the basic symbols of Lµ. In an n-ary nominal form, the nominal
symbols ∗1, . . . , ∗n may occur arbitrarily often. We shall always denote nom-
inal forms by the letters A,B, C (possibly with subscripts). If A is an n-ary
nominal form (n ≥ 1) and z1, . . . , zn are non-empty finite strings of symbols,
then A[z1, . . . , zn] denotes the string of symbols which is obtained from A by
simultaneously replacing all nominal forms ∗1, . . . , ∗n by z1, . . . , zn.
Definition 4 The formulas A,B,C, . . . (possibly with subscripts) of Lµ are
inductively defined as follows:
1. All atomic propositions P and free variables U as well as their comple-
ments ∼P and ∼U are formulas of Lµ.
2. The propositional constants ⊥ and > are formulas of Lµ.
3. If A and B are formulas of Lµ, then (A∨B) and (A∧B) are formulas
of Lµ.
4. If a is a label and B a formula, then 〈a〉B and [a]B are formulas of Lµ.
5. If A[U ] is a formula of Lµ which does not contain occurrences of ∼U
and if the free variable U and the bound variable X do not occur in A,
then (µX)A[X] and (νX)A[X] are formulas of Lµ.
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An Lµ formula A is positive in U if it does not contain any occurrences of
∼U . Hence Lµ formulas (µX)A[X] and (νX)A[X] can only be built if A[U ]
is positive in U .
The formulas ∼P and ∼U act as negations of P and U , respectively. For
introducing the negations of general formulas we make use of the law of
double negation, de Morgan’s laws and specific dualities between the modal
operators 〈a〉/[a] and least/greatest fixed points.
Definition 5 The negation ¬A of an Lµ formula A is inductively defined as
follows:
1. If A is the atomic proposition P , then ¬A is ∼P ; if A is the formula
∼P , the ¬A is P .
2. If A is the free variable U , then ¬A is ∼U ; if A is the formula ∼U , the
¬A is U .
3. If A is the propositional constant ⊥, then ¬A is >; if A is the propo-
sitional constant >, then ¬A is ⊥.
4. If A is the formula (B ∨C) then ¬A is (¬B ∧ ¬C); if A is the formula
(B ∧ C) then ¬A is (¬B ∨ ¬C).
5. If A is the formula 〈a〉B then ¬A is [a]¬B; if A is the formula [a]B
then ¬A is 〈a〉¬B.
6. If A is the formula (µX)A[X], then ¬A is (νX)A˜[X]; if A is the formula
(νX)A[X], then ¬A is (µX)A˜[X]. Here A˜ is the (uniquely determined)
unary nominal form so that ¬A[∼U ] is A˜[U ] for all free variables U .
Observe that the definitions of ¬(µX)A[X] and ¬(νX)A[X] make sense since
the U -positivity of A[U ] implies the U -positivity of A˜[U ]. We abbreviate the
remaining connectives as usual,
(A→ B) := (¬A ∨B),
(A↔ B) := ((A→ B) ∧ (B → A)),
and omit parentheses if there is no danger of confusion. Given a formula
A, we write fv(A) for the collection of all free variables occurring in A. A
formula A is called closed or a sentence if fv(A) is empty.
Definition 6 A Kripke structure for Lµ is a triple M = (M,H0, H1) satis-
fying the following three conditions:
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(KS.1) M is a set, the so-called universe of M; the elements of M are the
worlds of M.
(KS.2) H0 is a mapping which assigns to any label a a binary relation H0(a)
on M , i.e. H0(a) ⊂M ×M .
(KS.3) H1 is a mapping which assigns to any atomic proposition P a subset
H1(P ) of M .
IfM is the Kripke structure (M,H0, H1), then we normally write |M| for the
universe M of M as well as M(a) and M(P ) for the interpretations H0(a)
and H1(P ) of the names a and atomic propositions P , respectively.
A valuation v in a Kripke structure M assigns to each free variable U a
subset v(U) of |M|. Now let v be any valuation in M, U a free variable and
S a subset of |M|. Then we write v[U :S] for the valuation which maps U on
S and otherwise agrees with v.
Definition 7 Consider a Kripke structure M. Then, for any valuation v
in M, the truth set ‖A‖(M,v) of an Lµ formula A is inductively defined as
follows:
1. For atomic propositions, free variables and propositional constants:
‖P‖(M,v) := M(P ), ‖∼P‖(M,v) := |M| \M(P ),
‖U‖(M,v) := v(U), ‖∼U‖(M,v) := |M| \ v(U),
‖>‖(M,v) := |M|, ‖⊥‖(M,v) := ∅.
2. For disjunctions and conjunctions:
‖A ∨B‖(M,v) := ‖A‖(M,v) ∪ ‖B‖(M,v),
‖A ∧B‖(M,v) := ‖A‖(M,v) ∩ ‖B‖(M,v).
3. For formulas prefixed by a modal operator:
‖〈a〉B‖(M,v) := {x ∈ |M| : (∃y)((x, y) ∈M(a) and y ∈ ‖B‖(M,v))},
‖[a]B‖(M,v) := {x ∈ |M| : (∀y)((x, y) ∈M(a) ⇒ y ∈ ‖B‖(M,v))}.
4. For fixed point formulas: Given a formula A[U ] where U does not
occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U , we first introduce the monotone
operator
Φ : Pow(|M|)→ Pow(|M|), Φ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖(M,v[U :S]).
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Based on this Φ, we now set
‖(µX)A[X]‖(M,v) := IΦ and ‖(νX)A[X]‖(M,v) := JΦ.
With this definition in mind, we can easily introduce the notions of µ-validity
and µ-satisfiability:
(µ-val) A formula A of Lµ is said to be µ-valid if |M| ⊂ ‖A‖(M,v) for all
Kripke structuresM and all valuations v inM; in this case we write
µ |= A.
(µ-sat) A formula A of Lµ is said to be µ-satisfiable if there exists a Kripke
structure M and a valuation v in M so that ‖A‖(M,v) 6= ∅.
Following Kozen’s paper [13], we now recall a Hilbert-style formalization
K(µ) of the propositional modal µ-calculus. The multi-modal version of the
modal logic K is simply extended by closure axioms and induction rules for
the least fixed point formulas (µX)A[X].
I. Logical axioms of K(µ). For all propositional tautologies A of Lµ, all
Lµ formulas B and C and all labels a:
A,(TAUT)
[a]B ∧ [a](B → C) → [a]C,(K)
II. Logical rules of K(µ). For all Lµ formulas A and B and all labels a:
A A→ B
B
,(MP)
A
[a]A
.(NEC)
III. Closure axioms of K(µ). For all Lµ formulas A[U ] so that the free
variable U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U :
A[(µX)A[X]]→ (µX)A[X].(µ-CLO)
IV. Induction rules of K(µ). For all Lµ formulas A[U ] so that U does not
occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U and all Lµ formulas B:
A[B]→ B
(µX)A[X]→ B .(µ-IND)
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Provability of a formula A in the Hilbert system K(µ) is defined as usual
and written as
K(µ) ` A.
It is easily checked that for greatest fixed point formulas (νX)A[X] the duals
of (µ-AX) and (µ-IND) can be derived in K(µ). The proof of the following
lemma is left to the reader.
Lemma 8 For all Lµ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ]
is positive in U , and for all Lµ formulas B we have:
1. K(µ) ` (νX)A[X] → A[(νX)A[X]].
2. K(µ) ` B → A[B] =⇒ K(µ) ` B → (νX)A[X].
4 The infinitary µ-calculi K+ω (µ) and Kω(µ)
In this section we introduce two cut-free µ-calculi, the system K+ω (µ) and the
system Kω(µ). Both introduce formulas (νX)A[X] by a kind of ω-rule and
therefore are infinitary deduction systems. We will later show that both are
sound and complete.
K+ω (µ) is an auxiliary system, needed for some technical reasons, which is
formulated in the extension L+µ of Lµ. The language L+µ is obtained from Lµ
by adding syntactic constructs (νnX)A[X] for all natural numbers n greater
than 0 to represent the finite approximations of (νX)A[X]. More precisely:
the definition of the formulas of L+µ corresponds to Definition 4 with one
additional clause:
6. If A[U ] is a formula of L+µ which does not contain occurrences of ∼U ,
if the free variable U and the bound variable X do not occur in A and
if n is a natural number greater than 0, then (νnX)A[X] is a formula
of L+µ .
Furthermore, for any L+µ formula A let A− denote the Lµ formula which is
obtained from A by first replacing all subexpressions of the form (νnX)A[X]
by (νX)A[X] and afterwards all free variables by >.
For measuring the complexities of L+µ formulas and in connection with the
truth lemma of Section 5 it turns out to be convenient to work with finite
sequences of ordinals. If α1, . . . , αn are ordinals, we write 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 for the
sequence σ whose length lh(σ) is n and whose i-th component (σ)i is the
ordinal αi; i.e.
σ = 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 =⇒ lh(σ) = n and (σ)i = αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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The empty sequence is written as 〈〉, and lh(〈〉) = 0. In the following we will
often denote finite sequences of ordinals by the boldface Greek letters σ and
τ (possibly with subscripts).
Let <lex be the strict lexicographical ordering of finite sequences of ordinals
and ≤lex its reflexive closure. Recall that <lex is a well-ordering on the set of
sequences of bounded lengths, though not a well-ordering in general. We also
need the component-wise ordering  of finite sequences of ordinals, given by
σ  τ :⇔ lh(σ) ≤ lh(τ ) and (σ)i ≤ (τ )i for 1 ≤ i ≤ lh(σ).
Clearly, the relation  is transitive. The concatenation ∗ of finite sequences
of ordinals is as usual, and therefore we have
σ ∗ τ = 〈α1, . . . , αm, β1, . . . , βn〉
whenever σ = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 and τ = 〈β1, . . . , βn〉. Ultimately, we introduce
on the finite sequences of ordinals a specific maximum operation unionsq by setting:
(i) σ unionsq 〈〉 := 〈〉 unionsq σ := σ; (ii) if σ = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 and τ = 〈β1, . . . , βn〉, then
σ unionsq τ :=
{ 〈max(α1, β1), . . . ,max(αm, βm), βm+1, . . . , βn〉 if m ≤ n,
〈max(α1, β1), . . . ,max(αn, βn), αn+1, . . . , αm〉 if n < m.
Now we are ready to turn to the ranks and lengths of all L+µ formulas. As
the following definition shows, the rank of every L+µ formula A will be a finite
sequence of ordinals less than or equal to ω, and the length of A simply is
the length of this sequence, hence a natural number.
Definition 9 The rank rk(A) of an L+µ formula A is inductively defined as
follows:
1. If A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition, a
free variable, the negation of a free variable or a propositional constant,
then rk(A) := 〈0〉.
2. If A is a formula (B ∨ C) or a formula (B ∧ C), then
rk(A) := (rk(B) unionsq rk(C)) ∗ 〈0〉.
3. If A is a formula 〈a〉B or a formula [a]B, then
rk(A) := rk(B) ∗ 〈0〉.
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4. If A is a formula (µX)A[X], then
rk(A) := rk(A[>]) ∗ 〈0〉.
5. If A is a formula (νX)A[X], then
rk(A) := rk(A[>]) ∗ 〈ω〉.
6. If A is a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0,
then
rk(A) := rk(A[>]) ∗ 〈n〉.
The length lh(A) of an L+µ formula A is the length of the finite sequence
rk(A), i.e. lh(A) := lh(rk(A)).
The following two lemmas summarize some elementary properties of the rank
and length functions. Their proofs are straightforward and will be omitted.
Lemma 10 For all L+µ formulas A we have
rk(A)  rk(A−) and lh(A) = lh(A−).
Lemma 11 For all L+µ formulas A, B and A[>], all labels a, all free vari-
ables U and all natural numbers n greater than 0 we have:
1. rk(A), rk(B) <lex rk(A ∨B) = rk(A ∧B).
2. lh(A), lh(B) < lh(A ∨B) = lh(A ∧B).
3. rk(B) <lex rk(〈a〉B) = rk([a]B).
4. lh(B) < lh(〈a〉B) = lh([a]B).
5. rk(A[U ]) = rk(A[⊥]) = rk(A[>]).
6. lh(A[U ]) = lh(A[⊥]) = lh(A[>]).
7. rk(A[U ]) <lex rk((µX)A[X]), rk((νX)A[X]), rk((νnX)A[X]).
8. lh(A[U ]) < lh((νX)A[X]) = lh((νnX)A[X]).
The following lemma is more interesting and useful for establishing some con-
nections between the ranks of formulas of the form (νX)A[X], (νn+1X)A[X]
and A[(νnX)A[X]]; see Theorem 13 below.
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Lemma 12 Suppose that A[U ] is an L+µ formula positive in U with the free
variable U occurring in A[U ] but not in A and suppose that B is an L+µ
formula satisfying rk(A[U ])  rk(B). Then there exists a finite (possibly
empty) sequence of ordinals σ so that
rk(A[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ.
Proof. We show this lemma by induction on lh(A[U ]) and distinguish the
following cases:
1. lh(A[U ]) = 1. Then A[U ] has to be the free variable U , and the assertion
is trivially satisfied.
2. A[U ] is a formula (A1[U ] ∨ A2[U ]). Then we have
rk(A1[U ]), rk(A2[U ])  rk(A[U ])  rk(B).(1)
If A1[U ] and A2[U ] contain the free variable U , we can apply the induction
hypothesis to both formulas and obtain
rk(A1[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ1 and rk(A2[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ2(2)
for suitable σ1 and σ2. Clearly, this implies
rk(A[B]) = ((rk(B) ∗ σ1) unionsq (rk(B) ∗ σ2)) ∗ 〈0〉,(3)
and we have our assertion for σ being the sequence (σ1 unionsq σ2) ∗ 〈0〉.
If only one of A1[U ] and A2[U ] – say A1[U ] – contains U , the induction
hypothesis yields
rk(A1[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ1(4)
for a suitable σ1. But now we also know that A2[B] is the formula A2[U ]
and deduce from (1) that
rk(A2[B])  rk(B).(5)
From (4) and (5) we conclude, for σ now being the sequence σ1 ∗ 〈0〉,
rk(A[B]) = ((rk(B) ∗ σ1) unionsq rk(A2[B])) ∗ 〈0〉 = rk(B) ∗ σ.(6)
3. A[U ] is a formula (A1[U ] ∧ A2[U ]). Then we proceed as in the previous
case.
4. A[U ] is a formula of a form not covered so far. Then the assertion
immediately follows from the induction hypothesis. 2
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Theorem 13 For all L+µ formulas (νX)A[X] and all natural numbers n
greater than 0 we have:
1. rk(A[>]) <lex rk((ν1X)A[X]).
2. rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) <lex rk((νn+1X)A[X]).
3. rk((νnX)A[X]) <lex rk((νX)A[X]).
Proof. The first and the third assertion are immediate consequences of
Definition 9. In order to prove the second assertion, pick a free variable U
which does not occur in A.
If this U does not even occur in A[U ], then A[(νnX)A[X]] is identical to the
formula A[>], hence
rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) <lex rk(A[>]) ∗ 〈n+ 1〉 = rk((νn+1X)A[X]).
It remains to establish the second assertion for the case that U occurs inA[U ].
In view of Lemma 11 we know that rk(A[U ])  rk((νnX)A[X]). Hence the
previous lemma and Definition 9 yield, for some σ,
rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) = rk((νnX)A[X]) ∗ σ = (rk(A[>]) ∗ 〈n〉) ∗ σ.
Together with rk((νn+1X)A[X]) = rk(A[>]) ∗ 〈n+1〉 this immediately gives
rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) <lex rk((νn+1X)A[X]), completing the proof of our the-
orem. 2
The infinitary calculus K+ω (µ) is formulated as a Tait-style system which
derives finite sets Γ,∆,Π,Σ, . . . (possibly with subscripts) of L+µ formulas
rather than individual L+µ formulas. These finite sets of L+µ formulas are
interpreted disjunctively, and in general we write Γ, A for Γ ∪ {A}; sim-
ilarly for expressions of forms like Γ,∆, A,B. In addition, if Γ is the set
{A1, . . . , Am} of L+µ formulas and a some label, then 〈a〉Γ stands for the set
{〈a〉A1, . . . , 〈a〉Am}.
K+ω (µ) contains the standard axioms and logical rules of the multi-modal
version of the logic K, the Tait-style analogues of the µ-closure-axioms plus
rules for introducing (νnX)A[X] and (νX)A[X].
I. Axioms of K+ω (µ). For all finite sets Γ of L+µ formulas, all atomic propo-
sitions P and all free variables U :
Γ, >,(Ax1)
Γ, P, ∼P,(Ax2)
Γ, U, ∼U.(Ax3)
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II. Logical rules of K+ω (µ). For all finite sets Γ,∆ of L+µ formulas, all labels
a and all L+µ formulas A,B:
Γ, A, B
Γ, A ∨B ,(∨)
Γ, A Γ, B
Γ, A ∧B ,(∧)
Γ, A
〈a〉Γ, [a]A, ∆ .(K)
III. µ-rules of K+ω (µ). For all finite sets Γ of L+µ formulas and all L+µ
formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U :
Γ, A[(µX)A[X]]
Γ, (µX)A[X] .(µ)
IV. ν-rules of K+ω (µ). For all finite sets Γ of L+µ formulas and all L+µ
formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U :
Γ, A[>]
Γ, (ν1X)A[X] ,(ν.1)
Γ, A[(νnX)A[X]]
Γ, (νn+1X)A[X] ,(ν.n+1)
. . . Γ, (νnX)A[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < ω)
Γ, (νX)A[X] .(ν.ω)
Provability of Γ in K+ω (µ) is defined as usual and denoted by K
+
ω (µ) ` Γ. On
account of the rule (ν.ω) there are derivations in K+ω (µ) which are infinitely
branching trees of infinite depths.
It is obvious from the formulation of these axioms and rules that K+ω (µ)
satisfies weakening in the usual sense; that is, if Γ is provable in K+ω (µ) and
if Γ is a subset of ∆, then ∆ is also provable in K+ω (µ).
It is not at all obvious that K+ω (µ) is sound and complete. The completeness
ofK+ω (µ) will be established in the next section by means of specific saturated
sets.
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Concerning soundness, problems might occur in connection with the infini-
tary rule (ν.ω). Its premises are exactly the finite stages of the greatest fixed
point represented by (νX)A[X]. However, in arbitrary Kripke structures a
greatest fixed point may very well be composed of transfinite stages. There-
fore, in the context of such models, the rule (ν.ω) does not provide sufficiently
many premises to be directly seen to be correct.
Nevertheless, K+ω (µ) will turn out to be sound. But rather than showing its
soundness directly, we will in Section 6 prove the soundness of a finite system
K<ω(µ) which contains K
+
ω (µ).
There is also a syntactic simplification Kω(µ) of K
+
ω (µ) which stays within
the language Lµ and avoids the specific constructs (νnX)A[X] which are not
part of Lµ. In Lµ the finite approximations of greatest fixed points (νX)A[X]
are represented by the Lµ formulas (νX)nA[X] which are inductively defined,
for each natural number n > 0, as follows:
(νX)1A[X] := A[>] and (νX)n+1A[X] := A[(νX)nA[X]].
Recursively replacing all expressions (νnX)A[X] of L+µ by these Lµ formulas
(νX)nA[X] provides a translation of L+µ into Lµ.
Definition 14 The translation A∗ of an L+µ formula A is inductively defined
as follows:
1. If A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition, a
free variable, the negation of a free variable or a propositional constant,
then A∗ := A.
2. If A is a formula (B ∨ C), then A∗ := (B∗ ∨ C∗); if A is a formula
(B ∧ C), then A∗ := (B∗ ∧ C∗).
3. If A is a formula 〈a〉B, then A∗ := 〈a〉B∗; if A is a formula [a]B, then
A∗ := [a]B∗.
4. If A is a formula (µX)A[X], then A∗ := (µX)A∗[X]; if A is a formula
(νX)A[X], then A∗ := (νX)A∗[X].
5. If A is a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than
0, then A∗ := (νX)nA∗[X].
This definition is extended to finite sets of L+µ formulas in the obvious way:
for Γ = {A1, . . . , An} we set Γ∗ := {A∗1, . . . , A∗n}.
Lemma 15 If A is a formula of L+µ , then A∗ is a formula of Lµ. Moreover,
if A is a formula of Lµ, then A∗ and A are identical.
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The proof of this lemma is trivial. It is interesting to note that the L+µ
formula A and the Lµ formula A have the same “meaning”; their ranks, on
the other hand, can be completely different.
As K+ω (µ), the calculus Kω(µ) is formulated in a Tait-style manner, now
deriving finite sets of Lµ formulas. The axioms, the logical rules and the
µ-rules of Kω(µ) correspond exactly to the axioms, logical rules and µ-rules
of K+ω (µ); because of our syntactic simplification the rules (ν.1) and (ν.n+1)
are not needed in Kω(µ), and the rule (ν.ω) is converted to the rule (ν)
which works with the Lµ formulas (νX)nA[X] instead of the L+µ formulas
(νnX)A[X].
I. Axioms of Kω(µ). For all finite sets Γ of Lµ formulas, all atomic propo-
sitions P and all free variables U :
Γ, >,(Ax1)
Γ, P, ∼P,(Ax2)
Γ, U, ∼U.(Ax3)
II. Logical rules of Kω(µ). For all finite sets Γ,∆ of Lµ formulas, all labels
a and all Lµ formulas A,B:
Γ, A, B
Γ, A ∨B ,(∨)
Γ, A Γ, B
Γ, A ∧B ,(∧)
Γ, A
〈a〉Γ, [a]A, ∆ .(K)
III. µ-rules of Kω(µ). For all finite sets Γ of Lµ formulas and all Lµ
formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U :
Γ, A[(µX)A[X]]
Γ, (µX)A[X] .(µ)
IV. ν-rules of Kω(µ). For all finite sets Γ of Lµ formulas and all Lµ formulas
A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U :
. . . Γ, (νX)nA[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < ω)
Γ, (νX)A[X] .(ν)
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In analogy to before, we write Kω(µ) ` Γ to express that the finite set Γ of
Lµ formulas is provable in Kω(µ).
We are free to regardKω(µ) as the Lµ counterpart of the L+µ calculusK+ω (µ).
In particular, we have the following embedding result.
Theorem 16 For all finite sets Γ of L+µ formulas we have
K+ω (µ) ` Γ =⇒ Kω(µ) ` Γ∗.
In particular, if ∆ is a finite set of Lµ formulas, then
K+ω (µ) ` ∆ =⇒ Kω(µ) ` ∆.
Proof. To show the first assertion, we proceed by induction on the proof of
Γ in K+ω (µ). Just observe that all applications of the rules (ν.1) and (ν.n+1)
trivialize in view of the *-translation and that (ν.ω) goes over into (ν). The
second assertion is a direct consequence of the first and Lemma 15. 2
5 Saturated sets
We will show the completeness of the calculus K+ω (µ) by extending the tech-
nique of saturated sets, cf. e.g. Alberucci and Ja¨ger [1]. Before we go on, we
need some additional notation.
Definition 17 The Fischer-Ladner closure FL(D) of an Lµ sentence D is
the set of Lµ formulas which is inductively generated as follows:
1. D belongs to FL(D).
2. If (A ∨B) belongs to FL(D), then A and B belong to FL(D).
3. If (A ∧B) belongs to FL(D), then A and B belong to FL(D).
4. If 〈a〉B belongs to FL(D), then B belongs to FL(D).
5. If [a]B belongs to FL(D), then B belongs to FL(D).
6. If (µX)A[X] belongs to FL(D), then A[⊥] and A[(µX)A[X]] belong
to FL(D).
7. If (νX)A[X] belongs to FL(D), then A[>] and A[(νX)A[X]] belong
to FL(D).
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The Fischer-Ladner closure is a standard concept in the realm of fixed-point
and dynamic logics, going back to Fischer and Ladner [8]. An uncomplicated
adaptation of the proof in this article yields the finiteness of FL(D).
Lemma 18 The cardinality of the Fischer-Ladner closure FL(D) of an Lµ
formula D is linear in the length lh(D) of D; in particular, FL(D) is finite.
Unfortunately, the Fischer-Ladner closure does not provide a sufficiently rich
framework for the model construction we plan to carry through. This will be
provided by the notion of strong closure SC(D) of an Lµ formula D which is
defined now.
Definition 19 The strong closure SC(D) of an Lµ sentence D is the set of
L+µ formulas which is inductively generated as follows:
1. D belongs to SC(D).
2. If (A ∨B) belongs to SC(D), then A and B belong to SC(D).
3. If (A ∧B) belongs to SC(D), then A and B belong to SC(D).
4. If 〈a〉B belongs to SC(D), then B belongs to SC(D).
5. If [a]B belongs to SC(D), then B belongs to SC(D).
6. If (µX)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[⊥] and A[(µX)A[X]] belong
to SC(D).
7. If (νX)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[>] and, for every natural num-
ber n greater than 0, (νnX)A[X] belong to SC(D).
8. If (ν1X)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[>] belongs to SC(D).
9. If n is a natural number greater than 0 and (νn+1X)A[X] belongs to
SC(D), then A[(νnX)A[X]] belongs to SC(D).
10. If A[>] belongs to SC(D), then, for every free variable U , A[U ] belongs
to SC(D).
The sets SC(D) are infinite in general. Nevertheless we have a decisive
relationship between the sets FL(D) and SC(D) which is described in the
following lemma and easily proved by induction on the generation of the set
SC(D).
Lemma 20 Let D be some Lµ sentence. Then for all L+µ formulas A we
have
A ∈ SC(D) =⇒ A− ∈ FL(D).
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It is a direct consequence of Lemma 10 that the sets {lh(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} and
{lh(A−) : A ∈ SC(D)} are identical. The previous lemma and Lemma 18,
stating the finiteness of the Fischer-Ladner closure FL(D), thus imply a
further finiteness result.
Lemma 21 Let D be some Lµ sentence. Then {lh(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} is a
finite set of natural numbers.
Therefore the ranks of all formulas in SC(D) are finite sequences of ordi-
nals whose lengths are bounded by some natural number and, consequently,
according to a standard result, well-ordered by their lexicographical ordering.
Lemma 22 If D is a sentence of Lµ, then the restriction of the lexicograph-
ical ordering <lex to the set {rk(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} is a well-ordering.
In other words, definitions and proofs by induction on the ranks of the for-
mulas from SC(D) are legitimate.
This justifies, for example, to canonically extend the semantics of Lµ to L+µ .
Given a sentence D of Lµ, a Kripke structure M and a valuation v in M,
we simply add, for n ≥ 1 and formulas (ν1X)A[X] and (νn+1X)A[X] from
SC(D), the following clauses:
‖(ν1X)A[X]‖(M,v) := ‖A[>]‖(M,v),
‖(νn+1X)A[X]‖(M,v) := ‖A[(νnX)A[X]]‖(M,v).
We now come to the central concept of this section. The starting point is
an arbitrary formula D of Lµ. Then we are interested in all finite subsets of
SC(D) which are not derivable inK+ω (µ) and have the closure properties (S.2)
and (S.3) below. These so-called D-saturated sets will form the elements of
the Kripke structure SD, cf. Definition 25, playing the crucial part in our
proof of the completeness of K+ω (µ).
Definition 23 Let D be some Lµ sentence. A finite subset Γ of SC(D) is
called D-saturated (with respect to K+ω (µ)) if the following conditions are
satisfied:
(S.1) K+ω (µ) 0 Γ.
(S.2) For all L+µ formulas A and B we have
A ∨B ∈ Γ =⇒ A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ,
A ∧B ∈ Γ =⇒ A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ.
19
(S.3) For all L+µ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is
positive in U and all natural numbers n greater than 0 we have
(µX)A[X] ∈ Γ =⇒ A[(µX)A[X]] ∈ Γ,
(νX)A[X] ∈ Γ =⇒ (νiX)A[X] ∈ Γ for some 0 < i < ω,
(νn+1X)A[X] ∈ Γ =⇒ A[(νnX)A[X]] ∈ Γ,
(ν1X)A[X] ∈ Γ =⇒ A[>] ∈ Γ.
Suppose that Γ is a finite subset of SC(D), not provable in K+ω (µ) and not
D-saturated. Then one of the conditions (S.2), (S.3) has to be violated for
Γ. By systematically correcting such deficiencies, we can extend this Γ to a
D-saturated ∆.
Lemma 24 Let D be some Lµ sentence. For every finite subset Γ of SC(D)
which is not provable in K+ω (µ) there exists a finite subset ∆ of SC(D) which
is D-saturated and contains Γ.
Proof. We begin by fixing an arbitrary enumeration F0, F1, . . . of all for-
mulas in SC(D) and call the least i such that the formula A from SC(D)
is identical to Fi the index of A. Besides that, we introduce the following
auxiliary notion:
Let N be a subset of SC(D). Then the N-rank rk(N,A) of a formula A from
SC(D) is set to be 〈0〉 provided that A ∈ N ,
A ∈ N =⇒ rk(N,A) = 〈0〉,
and inductively defined according to Definition 9 for all A not from N . In
analogy to the definition of lh(A) we write lh(N,A) for lh(rk(N,A)). Clearly,
for all subsets N,N1, N2 of SC(D) and all elements A of SC(D), these mod-
ified ranks have the following properties:
lh(N,A) ≤ lh(A),(1)
A ∈ N =⇒ rk(N,B[A]) = rk(N,B[>]),(2)
N1 ⊂ N2 =⇒ rk(N2, A) ≤lex rk(N1, A).(3)
From (1) and Lemma 21 we obtain a strengthening of Lemma 22: even the
restriction of <lex to the set {rk(N,A) : N ⊂ SC(D) and A ∈ SC(D)} is a
well-ordering. Given a subset N of SC(D) and a formula A from SC(D), it
therefore makes sense to write ot(N,A) for the order type of rk(N,A) with
respect to this well-ordering.
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Depending on the given finite subset Γ of SC(D) which, by assumption, is
not provable in K+ω (µ) we now inductively define, for each natural number
n, subsets Γn of SC(D) and auxiliary sets Mn; we convince ourselves during
this process that these Γn are not provable in K
+
ω (µ):
1. Γ0 := Γ and M0 := ∅.
2. If Γn is D-saturated, then Γn+1 := Γn and Mn+1 :=Mn.
3. If Γn is not D-saturated, we choose the formula A with least index that
violates either of the conditions in (S.2) and (S.3); afterwards Γn+1 andMn+1
are determined by distinguishing between the possible forms of A.
3.1. A is a formula (B ∨ C). Then we set
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {B,C} and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.2. A is a formula (B∧C). Since Γn is not provable in K+ω (µ) we know that
either
K+ω (µ) 0 Γn, B or K+ω (µ) 0 Γn, C.
Then we set
Γn+1 :=
{
Γn ∪ {B} if K+ω (µ) 0 Γn, B ,
Γn ∪ {C} otherwise
and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.3. A is a formula (µX)B[X]. Then we set
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {B[(µX)B[X]]} and Mn+1 := Mn ∪ {(µX)B[X]}.
3.4. A is a formula (νX)B[X]. Since Γn is not provable in K+ω (µ) we know
that
K+ω (µ) 0 Γn, (νiX)B[X]
for some natural number i greater than 0. We choose the least such i and set
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {(νiX)B[X]} and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.5. A is a formula (νi+1X)B[X] for some natural number i greater than 0.
Then we set
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {B[(νiX)B[X]]} and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.6. A is a formula (ν1X)B[X]. Then we set
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {B[>]} and Mn+1 := Mn.
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What we have done so far guarantees that, for all natural numbers n,
K+ω (µ) 0 Γn,(4)
Γ ⊂ Γn ⊂ Γn+1 and Mn ⊂ Mn+1,(5)
(µX)B[X] ∈Mn =⇒ B[(µX)B[X]] ∈ Γn.(6)
Next we turn to two properties of this sequence (Γ0,M0), (Γ1,M1), . . . which will
be crucial in proving that Γn will be D-saturated for some natural number n.
(i) If the formula (µX)B[X] belongs to Mn+1 but not to Mn, then
ot(Mn+1,B[(µX)B[X]]) < ot(Mn, (µX)B[X]).
(ii) If (µX)B[X] is the formula violating one of the conditions in (S.2) and (S.3)
which is picked at step n+ 1 of the construction described above, then
ot(Mn+1,B[(µX)B[X]]) < ot(Mn, (µX)B[X]).
To prove (i), assume that (µX)B[X] is an element of Mn+1 \Mn. By (2) and (3)
this implies
rk(Mn+1,B[(µX)B[X]]) = rk(Mn+1,B[>]) ≤lex rk(Mn,B[>]).(7)
But we also have, since (µX)B[X] /∈Mn,
rk(Mn,B[>]) <lex rk(Mn,B[>]) ∗ 〈0〉 = rk(Mn, (µX)B[X]).(8)
Assertions (7) and (8) imply rk(Mn+1,B[(µX)B[X]]) <lex rk(Mn, (µX)B[X]),
hence (i) is proved. Because of (6), (ii) is an immediate consequence of (i).
In a next step we assign to all finite subsets N and Π of SC(D), with Π not being
provable in K+ω (µ), their deficiency numbers dn(N,Π):
(D.1) If Π is D-saturated, then dn(N,Π) := 0.
(D.2) Otherwise, fix some enumeration A1, A2, . . . , Am (without repetitions) of all
elements of Π violating one of the conditions in (S.2) and (S.3) and set
dn(N,Π) := ωot(N,A1) # ωot(N,A2) # . . . # ωot(N,Am),
where # stands for the natural sum of ordinals as introduced, for example,
in Schu¨tte [20].
Coming to the end of this proof, we observe that (ii) together with the definition
of the relativized rank function and (3) yields for all natural numbers n that
Γn is not D-saturated =⇒ dn(Mn+1,Γn+1) < dn(Mn,Γn).(9)
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Since there are no infinite decreasing sequences of ordinals, one of the sets Γn has
to be D-saturated and is thus a possible candidate for the choice of ∆. 2
Our interest is in Kripke structures SD, depending on Lµ formulas D, whose
universes are the D-saturated subsets of SC(D). We will eventually show
that an Lµ formula D is provable in K+ω (µ) if D is valid in SD.
Definition 25 LetD be some Lµ sentence. ThenSD is the Kripke structure
which is defined by the following three conditions:
(SD.1) The universe |SD| of SD consists exactly of the D-saturated sets.
(SD.2) For any label a, the binary relation SD(a) on |SD| is given by
(Γ,∆) ∈ SD(a) :⇐⇒ (Γ,∆) ∈ |SD|2 and {B : 〈a〉B ∈ Γ } ⊂ ∆.
(SD.3) For any atomic proposition P , the subset SD(P ) of |SD| is given by
SD(P ) := {Γ ∈ |SD| : P /∈ Γ }.
Although we are finally interested in interpreting Lµ and L+µ formulas in
Kripke structures SD, technical reasons (see the proof of Lemma 33 below)
compel us to work with intermediate structures in which formulas of the form
(µX)A[X] are interpreted as stages of the least fixed points of the inductive
definitions associated to (the interpretation of) A. The depth of the nestings
of the fixed point operator µ has to be taken into account as well.
Definition 26 The µ-height hµ(A) of an L+µ formula A is inductively defined
as follows:
1. If A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition, a
free variable, the negation of a free variable or a propositional constant,
then hµ(A) := 0.
2. If A is a formula (B ∨ C) or a formula (B ∧ C), then
hµ(A) := max(hµ(B), hµ(C)).
3. If A is a formula 〈a〉B or a formula [a]B, then
hµ(A) := hµ(B).
4. If A is a formula (µX)A[X], then
hµ(A) := hµ(A[>]) + 1.
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5. If A is a is a formula (νX)A[X] or (νnX)A[X] for some natural number
n greater than 0, then
hµ(A) := hµ(A[>]).
From this definition we immediately obtain the first assertion of the following
lemma, and, together with Lemma 21, the second part.
Lemma 27
1. For all L+µ formulas A we have hµ(A) = hµ(A−) and hµ(A) < lh(A).
2. If D is an Lµ formula, then {hµ(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} is a finite set of
natural numbers.
These observations justify assigning to each Lµ formula D a specific natu-
ral number, the µ-bound of D, majorizing the µ-heights of the formulas in
SC(D).
Definition 28 The µ-bound bµ(D) of an Lµ sentence D is the least natural
number n so that hµ(A) ≤ n for all formulas A from SC(D).
The µ-heights and finite sequences of ordinals play an important role in the
context of so-called signed truth sets. This concept has been introduced in
Streett and Emerson [23] and is adjusted here to our needs.
Definition 29 Let D be some Lµ sentence whose µ-bound bµ(D) is the
natural number n, and consider a sequence of ordinals σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉.
Then, for any formula A from the set SC(D) and any valuation v in SD, the
signed truth set ‖A‖σ(D,v) is defined by induction on rk(A) as follows:
1. For atomic propositions, free variables and propositional constants:
‖P‖σ(D,v) := SD(P ), ‖∼P‖σ(D,v) := |SD| \SD(P ),
‖U‖σ(D,v) := v(U), ‖∼U‖σ(D,v) := |SD| \ v(U),
‖>‖σ(D,v) := |SD|, ‖⊥‖σ(D,v) := ∅.
2. For disjunctions and conjunctions:
‖A ∨B‖σ(D,v) := ‖A‖σ(D,v) ∪ ‖B‖σ(D,v),
‖A ∧B‖σ(D,v) := ‖A‖σ(D,v) ∩ ‖B‖σ(D,v).
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3. For formulas prefixed by a modal operator:
‖〈a〉B‖σ(D,v) := {Γ ∈ |SD| : (∃∆)((Γ,∆) ∈ SD(a) & ∆ ∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v))},
‖[a]B‖σ(D,v) := {Γ ∈ |SD| : (∀∆)((Γ,∆) ∈ SD(a)⇒ ∆ ∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v))}.
4. For least fixed point formulas: Given a formula A[U ] where U does not
occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U , we first introduce the monotone
operator
Φ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Φ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S]).
Based on this Φ, we now set, for m = hµ((µX)A[X]),
‖(µX)A[X]‖σ(D,v) := I<σmΦ .
5. For greatest fixed point formulas: Given a formula A[U ] where U does
not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U and k is a natural number
greater than 0:
‖(ν1X)A[X]‖σ(D,v) := ‖A[>]‖σ(D,v),
‖(νk+1X)A[X]‖σ(D,v) := ‖A[(νkX)A[X]]‖σ(D,v),
‖(νX)A[X]‖σ(D,v) :=
⋂
i<ω
‖(νiX)A[X]‖σ(D,v).
In the special case of a finite sequence of ordinals consisting of identical com-
ponents, a useful substitution property is available. Its proof is by induction
on rk(A[U ]).
Lemma 30 Let D be some Lµ sentence, B some L+µ formula and A[U ] an
L+µ formula where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U . Assume,
in addition, that A[U ] and A[B] belong to SC(D). For all ordinals σ and
all sequences of ordinals σ = 〈σ, . . . , σ〉 of length bµ(D), all valuations v in
SD and all subsets S of |SD| we then have
S = ‖B‖σ(D,v) =⇒ ‖A[B]‖σ(D,v) = ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S]).
Signed truth sets ‖A‖σ(D,v) deviate in two fundamental aspects from the truth
sets ‖A‖(SD,v): (i) subformulas (µX)B[X] of A are not interpreted by the cor-
responding least fixed points but only by their approximations determined
by the hµ((µX)B[X])-th component of σ; (ii) subformulas (νX)B[X] of A
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are interpreted as the intersection of the finite approximations of the corre-
sponding greatest fixed points, meaning that, in general, their interpretations
are proper supersets of the greatest fixed points. There is, however, an in-
teresting relationship between signed truth sets and truth sets.
Lemma 31 Let us assume that
(A.1) D is an Lµ sentence,
(A.2) κ is the least cardinal greater than the cardinality of |SD|,
(A.3) κ is the sequence of ordinals 〈κ, . . . , κ〉 of length bµ(D).
Then for all formulas A from SC(D) and valuations v in SD we have
‖A‖(SD,v) ⊂ ‖A‖κ(D,v).
Proof. This proceeds by induction on rk(A), and we distinguish the fol-
lowing cases:
1. A is an atomic proposition, a free variable or a propositional constants.
Then the assertion is obvious.
2. A is a disjunction or a conjunction, a formula prefixed by a modal operator
or a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0. Then
the assertion follows directly from the induction hypothesis.
3. A is a formula (µX)A[X] or (νX)A[X]. Then we first pick a free variable
U which does not occur in A and consider the two monotone operators
Φ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Φ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖(SD,v[U :S]),
Ψ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Ψ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖κ(D,v[U :S]).
By induction hypothesis we have Φ(S) ⊂ Ψ(S) for all S ⊂ SC(D); therefore
IΦ ⊂ IΨ and JΦ ⊂ JΨ. Consequently,
‖(µX)A[X]‖(SD,v) = IΦ ⊂ IΨ = I<κΨ = ‖(µX)A[X]‖κ(D,v),(1)
‖(νX)A[X]‖(SD,v) = JΦ ⊂ JΨ ⊂ J<ωΨ = ‖(νX)A[X]‖κ(D,v)(2)
are easily obtained by recalling the definitions of the truth sets and signed
truth sets of these fixed point formulas; for the last equality in (2) we also
have to make use of the previous lemma. This completes our proof. 2
Considering a formula (µX)A[X] and its unfolding A[(µX)A[X]] we want
to show that given a sequence of ordinals σ there exists a lexicographically
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smaller sequence τ such that the signed truth set of (µX)A[X] under σ is a
subset of the signed truth set of A[(µX)A[X]] under τ . This property will
be of crucial use to us when considering signed denotations in an induction
on sequences of ordinals of bounded length. For technical reasons we deal
with a more general version of this assertion.
Lemma 32 Let us assume that
(A.1) D is an Lµ sentence, A[U ] and B[U ] are formulas from SC(D) positive
in U , and U occurs neither in A nor in B,
(A.2) (µX)A[X] and B[(µX)A[X]] belong to SC(D),
(A.3) hµ((µX)A[X]) = m+ 1 and hµ(B[U ]) ≤ m,
(A.4) κ is the least cardinal greater than the cardinality of |SD|,
(A.5) σ is a sequence of ordinals 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 of length n = bµ(D),
(A.6) τ the sequence of ordinals 〈σ1, . . . , σm, α, κ, . . . , κ〉 of length n.
Then for every valuation v in SD and the associated monotone operator
Φ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Φ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S])
we have
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ ]) ⊂ ‖B[(µX)A[X]]‖
τ
(D,v).
Proof. We prove this assertion by induction on rk(B[U ]). Given a valuation
v in SD, we distinguish the following cases:
1. U does not occur in B[U ]. Then, trivially,
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ ]) = ‖B[U ]‖
σ
(D,v) and ‖B[U ]‖τ(D,v) = ‖B[(µX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v).
From hµ(B[U ]) ≤ m we further obtain ‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v) = ‖B[U ]‖τ(D,v), completing
the discussion of this case.
2. B[U ] is the formula U . In this case we first introduce the auxiliary
monotone operator
Ψ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Ψ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖τ(D,v[U :S])
However, since hµ(A[U ]) ≤ m, we have Φ(S) = Ψ(S) for all S ⊂ |SD|, and
this implies
‖B[U ]‖σ
(D,v[U :I<αΦ ])
= I<αΦ =
I<αΨ = ‖(µX)A[X]‖τ(D,v) = ‖B[(µX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v).
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3. B[U ] is a disjunction or a conjunction, a formula prefixed by a modal
operator, a formula (νX)A[X] or a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural
number n greater than 0. Then the assertion immediately follows from the
induction hypothesis.
4. B[U ] is a formula (µY )C[U, Y ] with U occurring in B[U ]. We select a free
variable V different from U which does not occur in C[(µX)A[X],>] and
consider the monotone operators
Ψ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Ψ(S) := ‖C[U, V ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ ][V :S]),
Ω : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Ω(S) := ‖C[(µX)A[X], V ]‖τ(D,v[V :S]).
We claim that
I<ξΨ ⊂ I<ξΩ for all ordinals ξ.(1)
This is proved by side induction on ξ. If Π is an element of I<ξΨ , we have
Π ∈ Ψ(I<ζΨ ) for some ζ < ξ. Consequently, the side induction hypothesis
implies
Π ∈ Ψ(I<ζΩ ) = ‖C[U, V ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ ][V :I<ζΩ ]).
By the choice of V we also know that the valuation v[U :I<αΦ ][V :I
<ζ
Ω ] is iden-
tical to the valuation v[V :I<ζΩ ][U :I
<α
Φ ], and so
Π ∈ ‖C[U, V ]‖σ
(D,v[V :I<ζΩ ][U :I
<α
Φ ])
.
Since rk(C[U, V ]) < rk(B[U ]), it is possible to apply the main induction
hypothesis and to infer that
Π ∈ ‖C[(µX)A[X], V ]‖τ
(D,v[V :I<ζΩ ])
= Ω(I<ζΩ ).
Together with the trivial fact Ω(I<ζΩ ) ⊂ I<ξΩ , this makes clear that claim (1)
holds.
From assumption (A.3) we obtain hµ(B[U ]) = k for some k ≤ m, and it is
then seen that
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ ]) = I
<σk
Ψ .
Combining this result with assertion (1) and the choice of κ, we may continue
with
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ ]) ⊂ I
<σk
Ω ⊂ I<κΩ .(2)
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Recalling that U occurs in B[U ], the inequality m + 1 < hµ(B[(µX)A[X]])
becomes obvious, and therefore
‖B[(µX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v) = ‖(µY )C[(µX)A[X], Y ]‖τ(D,v) = I<κΩ .(3)
By (2) and (3) our assertion is also proved for this case. 2
Lemma 33 (Truth lemma) Let D be some Lµ sentence and n its µ-bound
bµ(D). Then for all sequences of ordinals σ of lengths less than or equal to
n, all sentences A from SC(D), all D-saturated subsets Γ of SC(D) and all
valuations v in SD we have
A ∈ Γ =⇒ Γ /∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).
Proof. We show this lemma by main induction on the sequences of ordinals
of lengths less than or equal to n and side induction on rk(A), and distinguish
the following cases:
1. A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition or a
propositional constant. Then the assertion is easily verified.
2. A is a disjunction or a conjunction, a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural
number n greater than 0 or a formula (νX)A[X]. Then the assertion follows
directly from the side induction hypothesis; see Lemma 11 and Theorem 13.
3. A is a formula 〈a〉B. Then choose an arbitrary D-saturated ∆ satisfying
(Γ,∆) ∈ SD(a). Therefore {C : 〈a〉C ∈ Γ} ⊂ ∆ and, since A is an element
of Γ according to our assumption, this yields B ∈ ∆. By the side induction
hypothesis we obtain ∆ /∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v). This implies that Γ /∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).
4. A is a formula [a]B. Since Γ is D-saturated, K+ω (µ) does not prove Γ. By
the (K) rule of K+ω (µ) we infer that
K+ω (µ) 0 {C : 〈a〉C ∈ Γ}, B.(1)
But now we know, because of Lemma 24, that there exists a D-saturated ∆
with the properties
{C : 〈a〉C ∈ Γ} ⊂ ∆,(2)
B ∈ ∆.(3)
By (2) we have (Γ,∆) ∈ SD(a), by (3) the side induction hypothesis implies
∆ /∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v). And together this means that Γ /∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).
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5. A is a formula (µX)A[X]. Since, by assumption, A is an element of the
D-saturated Γ, we know
A[(µX)A[X]] ∈ Γ.(4)
We pick a free variable U which does not occur in A plus some valuation v
in SD and consider the monotone operator
Φ : Pow(|SD|)→ Pow(|SD|), Φ(S) := ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S]).
The µ-height of (µX)A[X] is a natural numberm+1 with hµ(A[U ]) ≤ m, and
σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 for suitable ordinals σ1, . . . , σn. According to Definition 29
we thus have
‖A‖σ(D,v) = ‖(µX)A[X]‖σ(D,v) = I<σm+1Φ .(5)
To establish our claim, regard the statement
Γ ∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).(6)
In view of (5) there exists an ordinal α < σm+1 so that Γ ∈ Φ(I<αΦ ), i.e.
Γ ∈ ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<αΦ )]).(7)
As above we choose κ to be the least cardinal greater than the cardinality
of Pow(|SC(D)|) and set τ := 〈σ1, . . . , σm, α, κ, . . . , κ〉. The previous lemma
therefore furnishes proof of
Γ ∈ ‖A[(µX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v).(8)
However, we also know that τ <lex σ, and, as a consequence of (4) and the
main induction hypothesis,
Γ /∈ ‖A[(µX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v).(9)
Lines (8) and (9) contradict each other, meaning that (6) is false. Hence Γ
cannot be an element of ‖A‖σ(D,v), and our proof is complete. 2
Theorem 34 (Truth theorem) Let D be some Lµ sentence and A a sen-
tence from SC(D). Then for all D-saturated subsets Γ of SC(D) and all
valuations v in SD we have
A ∈ Γ =⇒ Γ /∈ ‖A‖(SD,v).
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Proof. Again we take κ to be the least cardinal greater than the cardinality
of |SD| and κ to be the sequence of ordinals 〈κ, . . . , κ〉 of length bµ(D). Given
a sentence A from SC(D), a D-saturated subset of S(D) and a valuation v
in S, the truth lemma implies
Γ /∈ ‖A‖κ(D,v),
provided that A belongs to Γ. But now it only remains to apply Lemma 31
in order to deduce Γ /∈ ‖A‖(SD,v). This completes our argument. 2
Theorem 35 (Completeness of K+ω (µ)) For all sentences A of Lµ we
have
µ |= A =⇒ K+ω (µ) ` A.
Proof. If A is not provable in K+ω (µ), then, by Lemma 24, there exists
an A-saturated subset Γ of SC(A) which contains A as an element. Now
we apply the truth theorem and obtain Γ /∈ ‖A‖(SA,v), with v being any
valuation in SA. Consequently, A is not µ-valid. By contraposition we have
the desired result. 2
We close this section with the completeness result for the system Kω(µ).
Fortunately, the work is already done: by Theorem 16 the completeness of
K+ω (µ) carries over to Kω(µ).
Corollary 36 (Completeness of Kω(µ)) For all sentences A of Lµ we
have
µ |= A =⇒ Kω(µ) ` A.
As mentioned above, Kω(µ) andK
+
ω (µ) are also sound with respect to the se-
mantics introduced in Section 3. This follows immediately from Theorem 41
in the next section which states the soundness of the finite variant K<ω(µ)
of Kω(µ).
6 The finitization K<ω(µ) of Kω(µ)
It is only the rule (ν) which is responsible for possibly infinite derivations
in Kω(µ). All proofs will be completely finite if we succeed in restricting
the infinitely many premises of each application of (ν) to a finite subset.
Fortunately, this can be achieved by exploiting the small model property of
the propositional modal µ-calculus. A similar approach for PDF appears in
Leivant [15].
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Theorem 37 (Small model property) An exponential number-theoretic
function f can be defined for which we have: if A is a µ-satisfiable Lµ for-
mula, then there exist a Kripke structure M and a valuation v in M so that
the cardinality of |M| is smaller than f(lh(A)) and ‖A‖(M,v) 6= ∅.
Hence, if A is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite Kripke structure
whose number of worlds is exponentially bounded in the length of A. For
more details about this important result we refer to Bradfield and Stirling
[5] and Streett and Emerson [23].
Since the exact definition of the number-theoretic function f is not relevant
for what we are doing now, we omit further details concerning f . In the
following we simply write ` for the exponential function which assigns to any
Lµ formulas A the natural number `(A) := f(lh(A)). Moreover, for a finite
set Γ of Lµ formulas `(Γ) is defined to be the number `(A1∨ . . .∨Am), where
A1, . . . , Am is an enumeration of the elements of Γ without repetitions.
Utilizing ` to provide a finite bound for the number of premises of a rule
(ν), the finite versions of the ν-rules are obtained. Observe that the number
of premises of a finite ν-rule depends on the length of (the essential part
of) its conclusion; the set ∆ is added in the conclusions just to incorporate
weakening.
V. Finite ν-rules. For all finite sets Γ,∆ of Lµ formulas and all Lµ formulas
A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U :
. . . Γ, (νX)nA[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < `(Γ, (νX)A[X]))
Γ, (νX)A[X], ∆ .(f-ν)
The system K<ω(µ) is Kω(µ) with the ν-rules (ν) replaced by their finite
variants (f-ν), and the notion K<ω(µ) ` Γ is introduced in analogy to
Kω(µ) ` Γ.
Naturally, K<ω(µ) is a finite system. Besides that, every derivation in Kω(µ)
collapses to a derivation in K<ω(µ). The proof of this observation is by
induction on the derivations in Kω(µ), and one only has to observe that each
application of a rule (ν) in Kω(µ) may be replaced by the appropriate rule
(f-ν) in K<ω(µ).
Lemma 38 For all finite sets Γ of Lµ formulas we have
Kω(µ) ` Γ =⇒ K<ω(µ) ` Γ.
Of course, this means that the completeness of Kω(µ) transfers to K<ω(µ);
just combine the previous lemma with Corollary 36.
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Corollary 39 (Completeness of K<ω(µ)) For all sentences A of Lµ we
have
µ |= A =⇒ K<ω(µ) ` A.
What remains is to show the soundness of K<ω(µ). To do so, we proceed
by using the small model property, along with the following lemma about
the denotation of greatest fixed point on finite Kripke structures. Its proof
is standard and follows from more general results concerning approximations
of least and greatest fixed points of inductive definitions; see Theorem 3 and,
for example, Moschovakis [17].
Lemma 40 Let M be a Kripke structure so that the cardinality of its uni-
verse |M| is less than or equal to the natural number n. Then for all Lµ
formulas (νX)A[X] and all valuations v in M we have
‖(νX)A[X]‖(M,v) = ‖(νX)nA[X]‖(M,v).
Summing up this lemma and the small model property of the µ-calculus, we
can now easily establish the soundness of K<ω(µ). Some additional notation
is convenient: if Γ is the set {A1, . . . , Am} of Lµ formulas, then Γ∨ stands for
the Lµ formula (A1,∨ . . .∨, Am).
Theorem 41 (Soundness of K<ω(µ)) For all finite sets Γ of Lµ formulas
we have
K<ω(µ) ` Γ =⇒ µ |= Γ∨.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of Γ, and we
distinguish the following cases:
1. Γ is an axiom or the conclusion of a logical rule of K<ω(µ). Then our
assertion is obvious or an immediate consequence of the induction hypothesis.
2. Γ is the conclusion of a µ-rule of K<ω(µ). Then there exist a set ∆ of
Lµ formulas and an Lµ formula (µX)A[X] so that Γ is the set ∆, (µX)A[X]
and this rule has the form
∆, A[(µX)A[X]]
∆, (µX)A[X] .
Now the induction hypothesis yields
µ |= ∆∨ ∨ A[(µX)A[X]].(1)
But according to our semantics we also have
µ |= A[(µX)A[X]]→ (µX)A[X],(2)
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and therefore the desired µ-validity of Γ∨ is a trivial consequence of state-
ments (1) and (2).
3. Γ is the conclusion of a finite ν-rule ofK<ω(µ). Then there exist a set ∆ of
Lµ formulas and an Lµ formula (νX)A[X] so that Γ is the set ∆, (νX)A[X]
and this rule has the form
. . . ∆, (νX)nA[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < `(∆, (νX)A[X]))
∆, (νX)A[X], Π
for some auxiliary set Π. In this case the induction hypothesis yields
µ |= ∆∨ ∨ (νX)nA[X](3)
for all natural numbers n such that 0 < n < `(∆, (νX)A[X]). Now assume
that the formula (∆∨∨ (νX)A[X]) is not µ-valid. Then (¬∆∨∧¬(νX)A[X])
has to be µ-satisfiable, and we infer from the small model property, see Theo-
rem 37, that there exist a Kripke structure M and a valuation v in M so
that the cardinality of |M|, we call it k, is smaller than `(∆, (νX)A[X]) and
‖¬∆∨ ∧ ¬(νX)A[X]‖(M,v) 6= ∅.(4)
In view of Lemma 40 this inequality can be rewritten as
‖¬∆∨ ∧ ¬(νX)kA[X]‖(M,v) 6= ∅,(5)
implying that the formula (∆∨ ∨ (νX)kA[X]) is not µ-valid. However, this
is in contradiction to (3), and therefore (∆∨ ∨ (νX)A[X]) has to be µ-valid.
This completes the proof of our theorem. 2
Considering this theorem in the context of Lemma 38 and Theorem 16, it
provides the soundness of the two infinitary calculi K+ω (µ) and Kω(µ).
Corollary 42 (Soundness of K+ω (µ) and Kω(µ)) For all finite sets Γ of
Lµ formulas we have
K+ω (µ) ` Γ =⇒ Kω(µ) ` Γ =⇒ µ |= Γ∨.
What we have achieved are two very natural infinitary axiomatizations of the
propositional modal µ-calculus which are both sound and complete. They are
cut-free, but because of their completeness, cut rules could be added without
changing their strength. In this sense we have semantic cut elimination for
K+ω (µ) and Kω(µ).
K<ω(µ), on the other hand, is the finite collapse of Kω(µ) and is also cut-
free, sound and complete as such. One may argue how natural K<ω(µ) is
as a deductive system. However, the important purpose of this system is
to provide an explicit proof that a cut-free adequate axiomatization of the
propositional modal µ-calculus exists.
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Corollary 43 (Summary) The systems K<ω(µ), Kω(µ) and K
+
ω (µ) pro-
vide cut-free, sound and complete axiomatizations of the propositional modal
µ-calculus.
A natural research direction is to look for alternative cut-free, sound and com-
plete axiomatizations of the propositional modal µ-calculus. It would also
be interesting to see whether there is a syntactic procedure for transforming
proofs in K<ω(µ) + (Cut) into proofs in K<ω(µ). As a preparatory step it
might be reasonable to study the related question first for Kω(µ)+(Cut) and
Kω(µ).
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